We argue that default option is important for equity valuation and construct a model that explicitly prices the option to default or abandon the firm. An investment strategy that buys stocks that are classified as undervalued by our model and shorts overvalued stocks generates an annual 4-factor alpha of about 11% for U.S. stocks. The model's performance is stronger for stocks with higher value of default option, such as distressed or highly volatile stocks. We construct a similar strategy in a sample of nine most highly capitalized developed markets and find consistent results. Our findings suggest that investors do not properly incorporate the value of default options in stock prices.
Introduction
It has long been recognized in the finance literature that equity of a firm with debt in its capital structure is analogous to a call option written on the assets of the firm. The title of the seminal paper by Black and Scholes (1973) reflects the applicability of their model to the valuation of corporate debt and equity. Today, nearly every corporate finance textbook (see, for example, Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2011)) discusses the option-based approach to value equity and debt. An interesting question is whether analysts and investors incorporate this option-based approach in their equity valuation.
To address this question we build a structural equity valuation model that explicitly takes into account the value of the option to default (or abandon the firm) and examine whether our option-based valuation model can predict future stock returns. Default option is a key characteristic of corporate equity. Standard stock valuation techniques, such as multiplesvaluation or discounted cash flow, ignore the option to default. Using these techniques, therefore, can lead to misvaluation, especially among stocks with relatively high value of default option and higher prospects of default or exit. We identify this potential misvaluation with the help of our model. Option pricing models have been employed in the literature to gauge the probability of default and to value corporate bonds given the value of equity (see for example, Merton (1974) , Geske (1978) , and Delianedis and Geske (2003) , among others). We, instead, use an option pricing model to value the equity itself. Our model uses standard features of structural models -stochastic cash flows, fixed costs, and debt. We also allow for endogenous default, different tranches of debt with different maturities, and additional costs of financial distress.
While our model does not incorporate many aspects that have received considerable attention in corporate finance like investments or managerial entrenchment (see Ozdagli (2010) for a more carefully calibrated model of default), it is specifically tailored to value the default option. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to employ a structural option pricing model of endogenous default on a large cross-section of stocks to value corporate equity.
We start our analysis by sorting all stocks every month into ten equal-sized portfolios according to the ratio of the model value to market value of equity; that is, ratios higher (lower) than one indicate under-(over-) valuation according to our model. We find that most misvalued stocks, either over-or undervalued, are smaller, more volatile, and less liquid, have fewer analyst coverage with higher analysts' forecast dispersion, and have lower institutional ownership; indicating that these stocks are the most difficult to value. Excess returns on these sub-categories of stocks show patterns consistent with our valuation model. Monthly excess return for overvalued decile of stocks is 0.51% (4-factor alpha of −0.24%) while that for undervalued decile stocks is 1.15% (4-factor alpha of 0.67%). The long-short strategy that buys stocks that are classified as undervalued by our model and shorts overvalued stocks, thus, generates an annualized 4-factor alpha of about 11%. These differences are economically large and statistically significant. These results are stronger for equal-weighted portfolios (4-factor annualized alpha of about 16%), robust to various sub-samples and return horizons, and are confirmed using Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions.
To explore the role of the default option more directly, we investigate how the returns generated by the model vary across stocks with characteristics related to default option. The first characteristic is the extent of financial distress. Distressed stocks have high levels of debt and a substantial probability of default that makes the analogy between equity value and a call option particularly relevant. We measure financial distress using the model proposed by Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008, henceforth CHS) . The second characteristic is market capitalization; empirical evidence and conventional wisdom suggest that small companies are more likely to default. The third and the last characteristic is stock return volatility. Option pricing theory shows that the value of option increases with the volatility of the underlying asset. More volatile firms are more likely to hit the default or exit boundary.
We sort all stocks into equal-sized quintiles for distress and volatility, and quintiles using NYSE breakpoints for size. We then double-sort all stocks within each quintile into five equal-sized quintiles according to the model/market value ratio. Calculating the fraction of the default option value in the total model-equity value shows a clear relation between the importance of the default option and each of the characteristics. Most notably, for the top CHS quintile (most distressed stocks), the option to default accounts on average for 35.9% of equity value, compared to only 19.2% for the least distressed stock quintile (these numbers reflect also the value of the abandonment option, which is always positive in our model as long as fixed costs are non-zero). The difference in default option fraction between the two extreme size quintiles is 11%, and between the two extreme volatility quintiles is 15%.
These relations justify the choice of these characteristics, and also support the reliability of our model.
The returns generated by the model exhibit a clear pattern across the distress-based portfolios. Within the top distress quintile, undervalued stocks earn monthly 4-factor alpha higher by 1.19% than those earned by overvalued stocks. The equivalent difference within the bottom distress quintile is only 0.26% a month. The model's returns are also much higher among highly volatile stocks; 4-factor alpha of under/over value long-short strategy is 1.38% for the top volatility quintile, while is reduced to 0.39% among the least volatile stocks. The effect of firm size however is much weaker and not always monotonic. The model's 4-factor alpha is 0.75% for small firms and 0.43% for large firms. This is consistent with the fairly low difference between default option fractions of small and large stocks. Once again, evidence using equal-weighted portfolios is stronger in support of our conjecture.
The positive effect of firm characteristics, especially distress and volatility, on the model's performance strongly suggests that the option to default is a primary driver in the predictive ability of the model over future stock returns. To verify this finding we conduct the following test. We derive our model's equity values while shutting down the option to default, and we use these values to re-sort and calculate the returns within each characteristic-quintile. The model's performance is substantially weaker without the default option. The model's 4-factor alpha is reduced from 1.19% to 0.28% for most distressed stocks, and from 1.38% to 0.33% for most volatile stocks. These reductions provide further indication to the importance of default option in our model's estimates, and more generally, are consistent with the conjecture that option to default is hard to estimate, leading thus to stock mispricing.
As an out-of-sample test, we apply our methodology to the cross-section of stocks in a sample of nine most highly capitalized other developed markets. Sorting stocks on our modelbased relative valuation, we find that, on average across the countries, the 4-factor alpha of a long-short value-(equal-)weighted strategy is 0.79% (1.19%). This value-(equal-)weighted alpha is significant for four (eight) of the countries in our sample. Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions provide corroborating evidence; controlling for stock characteristics, the coefficient on relative model value is significant for six of our countries.
Our results suggest that default option values are not fully incorporated in equity prices, neither in the U.S., nor in the majority of other developed countries. It may seem that ignoring the optionality of equity will always lead to undervaluation of equity. While indeed, based on our model a median U.S. firm is undervalued by about 6.9% in our sample, we do not make the strong claim that investors are unaware of the possibility of default by equityholders. Our conjecture is only that the investors do not value the resulting option properly.
1 In other words, standard valuation techniques, by employing more crude proxies of this optionality, lead to misvaluation (under or over) of equity.
An interesting question raised by our study is why do investors not use option valuation models to value stocks. One potential explanation is the complexity involved in implementing such models. We hypothesize that many investors, especially retail investors, do not possess 1 Anecdotal evidence suggests that even top equity analysts do not recognize the default-like features of equity. We studied analyst reports on Ford Motor around late 2008 to early 2009. Ford was in deep financial distress at that time and the option to default was in-the-money. Yet there is no evidence that analysts from top investment banks incorporated that option value in their analysis. For example, Société Générale based its price estimate on the long-term enterprise-value-to-sales ratio, while Deutsche Bank and JP Morgan used enterprise value over EBITDA ratio. In addition, Deutsche bank used a discount rate of 20%, and Credit Suisse used a DCF model with a "big increase" in the discount rate. These different approaches result in very different values. For example, the JP Morgan target price for Ford in late October is $2.43 per share, while the Credit Suisse target price is $1.00 per share.
the necessary skills to implement such a model. This conjecture is consistent with the evidence presented by Poteshman and Serbin (2003) who document that investors often exercise call options in a clearly irrational manner, suggesting that it is hard for certain types of investors to understand and value options correctly (Poteshman and Serbin find that this is particularly true for retail investors; traders at large investment houses do not exhibit irrational behavior.) Furthermore, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) show that when faced with a portfolio optimization problem, many investors follow naïve and clearly suboptimal strategies again suggesting that investors fail to fully understand more sophisticated models. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) argue that limited attention and processing power may lead investors to ignore or underweight information that is important for an option-based model to produce unbiased valuations (for example, one of the key inputs in our model is volatility of sales).
We would like to emphasize that our model does a good job of relative valuation by separating under-and overvalued stocks, but does not necessarily always capture the fundamental value of stocks. For example, amongst the stocks classified as fairly valued by our model, distressed stocks earn much lower returns. This implies that our valuation model still misses common factors that could explain the overall low/negative returns of distressed stocks. Explaining this low-return puzzle is outside the scope of our paper.
We reiterate that the power of our model is in the valuation of the option to default and/or shut down the firm. For stocks far from the default boundary (e.g., stocks with high cash flows, low volatility, and low leverage ratios), normal valuation techniques are still adequate and not much may be gained by using our model for such stocks. This is confirmed by our empirical results. The performance of the long-short strategy based on our valuation model deteriorates when applied to firms with low value of default option. Finally, while our model can also be used to price corporate debt, the objective of our study is only to use it for equity valuation and to study the impact of default option valuation on stock returns.
Valuation model
A key characteristic of corporate equity is the default option. One source of difficulty in valuing equity, therefore, may come from the necessity of using an appropriate model to account for the value of the option to default. Any valuation model that fails to properly value this option is going to produce values that are further away from fundamental value than a model that accounts for this option.
Option pricing structural models have been employed in the literature to gauge the probability of default and to value corporate bonds given the value of equity. Our objective is to deploy an option pricing model to perform valuation of equity. As we explain in detail later in this section, our option-pricing based approach scores over the traditional approach on two fronts. First, we are better able to estimate future cash flows by explicitly accounting for the exercise of the default option by the equityholders. Thus, our model accounts for the truncation in cash flows-at very low states of demand when cash flows are sufficiently negative it is optimal to exercise the default option rather than to continue to operate the firm. This optionality is missed by commonly employed valuation methods. Second, the estimation of time variation in discount rates is typically a difficult task; it becomes even more difficult for firms with high default risk where any small change in firm value can significantly change the risk of equity. The option-pricing approach bypasses this problem by conducting the valuation under a risk-neutral measure.
2
Of course, the central insight that the equity of a firm with debt in its capital structure is analogous to a call option written on the assets of the firm dates back to the seminal paper by Black and Scholes (1973) . While nearly every corporate finance textbook discusses the option-based approach to value equity and debt, academic research on using these models to perform equity valuation is sparse. Most of the studies perform valuation of some specific types of companies, such as internet or oil companies, in a real options framework (see Moon and Schwartz (2000) for a an example).
3 By contrast, we implement our model on the entire cross-section of stocks.
Model
We assume that the cash flows of a firm i are driven by a variable x it that reflects stochastic demand for the firm's products. The firm incurs fixed costs and uses debt and, therefore, has contractual obligations to make coupon and principal payments to its debtholders. We also assume that a firm with negative free cash flow incurs an additional proportional expense η.
This extra cost reflects expenses that a financially distressed firm has to incur in order to maintain healthy relationship with suppliers, retain its customer base, deal with intensified agency costs like the under-investment problem, or the additional costs of raising new funds to cover for the short fall in cash flows. The free cash flow to equityholders of firm i is then
given by:
where x it is the state variable of firm i at time t, I it is the total interest payments to debtholders due at time t, D it is the principal repayment due at time t, F i is the total fixed cost that the company incurs per unit of time, τ is the tax rate, τ Dep it is the tax shield due to depreciation expense, Capex it is capital expenditures, and 1 (·) is an indicator variable.
Note that additional cost η is incurred only when the cash flow (before the repayment of principal) is negative, so the positive sign of η implies a negative effect on cash flows. We further assume that x it follows a geometric Brownian motion under the physical measure with a drift parameter µ i,P and volatility σ i :
Default is endogenous in our model similar to the majority of structural models (see, for example, Leland (1994) ). The equity holders are endowed with an option to default which they exercise optimally; they default if continuing to operate the firm results in a negative
value. In our model default occurs when cash flow to equity holders is sufficiently negative.
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Note that the presence of the fixed cost component, F i , means that the equityholders may decide to shut down operations and abandon the firm if the cash flow turns sufficiently negative even when the firm is debt-free. The option to exit is valuable even for an all-equity firm as long as F i is positive.
We further assume that a firm that survives until its long-term debt is repaid, refinances by issuing new debt with a perpetual coupon, rather than staying debt-free. At that moment (we assume that long-term debt matures in five years), the equityholders receive the proceeds from new debt issuance in exchange for a stream of subsequent coupon payments. See
Appendix B for details on the refinancing procedure and pricing of new debt.
Stockholders maximize the value of equity (we abstract from any potential conflicts of interest between managers and stockholders). The value of equity, V 0 , given the initial state variable x 0 is equal to the expected present value of future cash flows under the risk-neutral measure discounted by the risk-free rate r:
where x d (t) is the optimal default boundary and T x d (t) is a first-passage time of the process 4 Note that we implicitly assume that the equity holders of a firm with negative free cash flow may continue to inject cash (issue new equity) into the firm (unless they decide to default), but it is costly do so and this cost is reflected in the parameter η. This assumption is common in structural credit risk and capital structure models. Setting η equal to infinity would result in immediate default as soon as the cash flow to equity holders turns negative.
x to the boundary x d (t). 5 The default boundary is a function of time because debt has final maturity and coupon and principal payments are allowed to vary over time. The equity value can be decomposed into the value that would accrue to equityholders should they be forced to operate the firm forever (the discounted cash flow component) and the value of the default (abandonment) option:
Default option = sup
Equation (4) shows two fundamental differences between our valuation approach and traditional valuation methods. First, we discount cash flows to equityholders only up until the
. This stopping time is determined as the outcome of the optimization problem of the equityholders and results from the optimal exercise of the option to default.
By contrast, the usual valuation methods implicitly assume an infinite discounting horizon and ignore that option (value only the second term on the right-hand side of equation (4)).
Second, we use the risk-free rate and discount payouts to shareholders under the risk-neutral measure, while the standard valuation methods perform discounting under the physical measure. This also distorts valuations because risk and the appropriate discount rate under the physical measure varies significantly as the firm moves in and out of financial distress. In other words, as is well-known, one cannot price an option by expectation under the physical measure.
Implementation
We use both annual and quarterly COMPUSTAT data items as inputs to the model. firm i in year t is defined as:
where Sales it is the annual sales and COGS it is the cost of goods sold. There is a lot of short-term variation in capital expenditures and depreciation. In order to reduce this noise, we compute the average Capex/Sales ratio for the 2-digit SIC industry over the last three years, CSR t−3,t , and use this ratio and current sales for firm i to proxy for firm i's capital expenditures:
We model depreciation in a similar way:
where DSR t−3,t is the average depreciation to sales ratio for the 2-digit SIC industry over the last three years. We use selling, general, and administrative expenses (COMPUSTAT item XSGA) as a proxy for the fixed costs, F i .
We assume that firms issue two types of debt: short-term and long-term debt, but the model can incorporate any arbitrary maturity structure of debt. We use COMPUSTAT annual items DLT (long-term debt) and DLCC (debt in current liabilities) as proxies for company's long and short-term debt. We further assume that the short-term debt matures in one year, while the long-term debt matures in five years. Since the coupon rate of debt presumably depends on a company's default likelihood, we model the coupon rate on the long-term debt as the sum of the risk-free rate and the actual yield on debt with a corresponding credit rating. We use the sum of the average between the T-bill rate and the 10-year T-note rate as the risk-free rate. For credit spread rating, we first divide the firms into quintiles based on CHS (2008) distress measure (details on these calculations are given in Appendix A). We then use AAA, BBB and BBB+2% yields for distress quintiles 1-2, 3-4, and 5, respectively. We further assume that in year five, after the long term debt is paid off (if the firm has not defaulted before), the firm refinances its debt to match the industry average leverage ratio. Details on the refinancing procedure are provided in Appendix B.
We denote by GM it the gross margin ratio:
To model the evolution of x it we assume that this ratio stays constant in the future so future sales are proportional to the state variable x it : Sales is = x is /GM it for s ≥ t. We further assume that depreciation and Capex also remain proportional to sales (and, therefore, also proportional to x is ) in a similar way:
To model the growth rate of x it under the physical measure we use the standard approach discussed in many corporate finance textbooks (see, for example, Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2011)). Because our general setup is in continuous time we model growth in capital expenditures also in continuous time. We first posit that capital expenditures generate growth.
Thus, Capex it invested over a time interval [t, t + dt] results in an expected (under P ) increase in the operating cash flow by Capex it R A dt over the next interval dt, where R A is the after-tax return on assets and (instantaneous) operating cash flow, OCF , are defined as after-tax gross margin plus depreciation tax shield:
Then, the expected growth rate in operating cash flows (under P ) equals:
Because operating cash flow in our setup is proportional to x it , it follows that the drift parameter of the process x it under the physical measure is given by:
where E P t is the conditional expectation under the physical measure P at time t.
We note that while the drift of x it under the physical measure is given by µ i,P = R A − DY i,P , the growth rate under risk-neutral measure is given by µ i,Q = r − DY i,Q , where DY is the dividend yield and r is the risk-free rate. Since the dividend yield is the same under both measures, DY i,P = DY i,Q , it follows that:
When we implement the model, we need to use the risk-neutral growth µ i,Q because all the pricing is done under the risk-neutral measure Q. To measure the return on assets R A , we calculate the cost of equity by using CAPM. We estimate firms' betas over the past three-year period and then average across all firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry that also fall in the same distress quintile based on the CHS (2008) measure of financial distress.
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We model cost of debt as described before. The return on assets, R A , is then equal to the weighted average of the cost of equity capital and the cost of debt.
We proxy σ by the annualized quarterly volatility of sales over the last eight quarters.
If quarterly sales values are not available in COMPUSTAT, we use the average quarterly volatility of sales of the firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry over the last eight-quarter period. We use volatility of sales as opposed to volatility of x it in equation (2) because we believe it better reflects the volatility of the underlying demand-driven stochastic process, which drives valuation in structural models like ours. Using volatility of x it instead would capture some short-term variations in the costs of goods sold and capital expenditures which are not related to the underlying economic uncertainty and therefore should not affect the value of the option to default (nevertheless, we get similar results using volatility of Sales − COGS). We use 35% for the corporate tax rate, τ , while we set the distress costs, η, to 15%. 8 The inputs to the model are summarized in Table 1 .
A potential minor issue with our approach is that a small percentage (on average 5%)
of companies have negative current values of the gross margin, while we assume that x it is a geometric process and hence always positive. We exclude these companies from our main set of tests. However, in robustness checks we follow an alternative approach. Since we cannot assume geometric growth for such companies, we assume, instead, that x it follows an arithmetic Brownian motion until the moment it reaches the value equal to its annualized standard deviation (of course, before the company defaults), at which point we assume that
x it begins to grow geometrically. We obtain similar results using this alternative assumption.
Finally, we employ a standard binomial numerical algorithm to determine both the optimal default boundary and the value of equity in equation (3). Further numerical details on the implementation of our procedure are provided in Appendix B.
Model performance
We perform our valuation on the entire universe of stocks which we obtain by merging annual and quarterly COMPUSTAT data with the return data from CRSP. Then, each month we sort all stocks into deciles according to the ratio of the equity value implied by our valuation model to the actual equity value. Decile one contains the most overvalued stocks while decile ten consists of the most undervalued stocks. This valuation sort is similar in spirit to scaling the market price in order to predict returns (Lewellen (2004) ). While the most usual scaling variable is the book value, some studies use model implied valuation as a scaling variable.
For example, Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) use the ratio of residual income value to market value to predict future returns. Our approach, while using a different valuation method, is similar in its use of the sorting variable.
We report the characteristics of these portfolios in Table 2 . In addition to size, market-tobook, market beta (calculated using past 60 months), past six-month return, and standard deviation of daily stock returns, we also show the percentage of firms reporting negative earnings, number of analysts, the standard deviation of their forecasts, equity issuance, institutional ownership, and two proxies for liquidity, namely share turnover and Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure. Accounting and stock return data are from CRSP and COM-PUSTAT and all analyst data are from IBES. For each characteristic, we first calculate the cross-sectional mean and median of each portfolio. The table then reports the time-series averages of these means and medians. We exclude observations in the top and the bottom percentiles in calculating the means and medians. We include all common stocks, although our results are robust to the exclusion of financial stocks. The sample period for our study is 1983 to 2012 as the coverage of quarterly COMPUSTAT data is sparse before this date.
In unreported results, we find that median model value is 6.9% higher than the market value. This suggests that on average stocks are undervalued (consistent with investors ignoring or placing less emphasis on the default option). As expected, the median spread increases at times when credit spreads are high (9.6% vs. 4.8%) and also in recessions vs.
expansions (11.0% vs. 6.5%), i.e. when default options are more valuable. The spread is also higher for stocks with high institutional ownership. It is indeed likely that more sophisticated institutional investors are in a better position to value default option and are more likely to buy undervalued stocks, for which the model-to-market ratio is relatively high. have, unsurprisingly, higher market-to-book ratios than most undervalued stocks (decile ten), which also explain their higher market beta. Decile one stocks also show higher past returns and issue more equity than decile ten stocks. These equity issuance patterns are consistent with our valuation model under the additional assumption that managers of these firms understand true valuations and time the market in issuing equity.
We have conjectured that the stocks in the extreme deciles are the most misvalued by the market, apparently due to the market's inability to value the default option correctly.
We check whether the stocks in these deciles do, in fact default more often than more fairly valued stocks. We calculate the fraction of stocks that default based on CRSP's delisting codes associated with poor performances, such as bankruptcy, liquidation, dropping due to bad performances, etc. In unreported results, we find that the average default rate of stocks in deciles one and ten is 6.6%, 11.0%, and 14.6% in one-, two-, and three-years after portfolio formation, respectively (cf. default rate of stocks in decile R5 is 1.1%, 2.2%, and 3.4%). These statistics provide further indication that the misvaluation picked up by our model is related to default option.
Portfolio returns of stocks sorted on model valuation
We proceed to check the efficacy of our valuation model by calculating returns of the ten portfolios. We form both value-and equal-weighted portfolios. While value-weighting is more common in the literature, Table 2 shows that more mispriced stocks are smaller on average. It is, thus, possible that equal-weighting leads to stronger performance of our sorts.
Accordingly, we present most of results for value-weighted portfolios but also show equalweighted portfolios for reference. Table 3 reports the monthly returns on each portfolio as well as the returns to the hedge portfolio that is long the most undervalued firm portfolio (decile ten) and short the most overvalued firm portfolio (decile one). In addition to reporting the average return in excess of the risk-free rate, we also report the alphas from one-, three-, and four-factor models. The one-factor model is the CAPM model. We use Fama and French (1993) factors in the three-factor model. These factors are augmented with a momentum factor in the four-factor model. All factor returns are downloaded from Ken French's website.
All returns and alphas are in percent per month and numbers in parentheses denote the corresponding t-statistics. Table 3 shows that returns and factor-model alphas are generally monotonically increasing when one moves from decile one (most overvalued stocks) to decile ten (most undervalued stocks, supporting our model's ability to detect stock mispricing. The hedge portfolio has excess returns of 0.65% per month (t-statistic=2.10). Factor model alphas display patterns consistent with excess returns and characteristics of stocks shown previously in Table 2 .
For example, since decile ten stocks are, on average, smaller and have lower market-to-book ratios than decile one stocks, the 10−1 portfolio has lower 3-factor alpha at 0.49% than CAPM alpha at 0.82%. At the same time, since past returns for decile ten stocks are lower than those for decile one stocks, the 4-factor alpha of the long-short portfolio is higher at 0.91% (t-statistic=3.68). Regardless of the risk correction, the alphas of 10−1 portfolio are economically large and mostly statistically significant. 9 The last column of Table 3 shows that, as suspected, the hedge portfolio returns on equal-weighted portfolios are even higher; the 4-factor alpha is 1.27% (t-statistic=6.65).
Since our holding period is only one month, we check the robustness of these results to the inclusion of a short-term reversal factor. Alpha from this alternate five-factor model is similar to that from a four-factor model; the 5-factor alpha of the 10−1 portfolio is 0.86%
(t-statistic=3.53). We also calculate a five-factor model with an additional liquidity factor of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) . The alpha from this model is even higher than the 4-factor alpha at 0.95% (t-statistic=3.57). We also check whether these returns can be explained by a volatility factor. We find that the loading of the 10−1 portfolio return on changes in VIX (proxy for volatility factor) is small and statistically insignificant.
We further examine the robustness of the results to different subsamples and return horizons in Table 4 . To reduce the clutter in the table, we report only the 4-factor alphas for each portfolio. To facilitate comparison with the main results, we also report the full-sample results in the first row of the table. We consider three different kinds of subsamples. The first simply tabulates results for the months of January versus the rest of the months. It is well known that small stocks often tend to rally in January and both stocks in our R1 and R10 deciles have lower market capitalization than mid-decile stocks. The second considers 9 Some readers have suggested that post-formation returns are not necessarily a sufficient test of the goodness of our valuation model, especially if market valuation drifts even further away from our 'fair' valuation. We check this by computing value gap, the difference between market valuation and our valuation. We calculate this value gap at portfolio formation and one quarter after portfolio formation (numbers not reported). We verify that the value gap does indeed shrink on average one quarter after portfolio formation. At the same time, the value gap does not decline to zero, suggesting that correction takes longer than one quarter (see also robustness checks on long horizon returns later in this section). different states of the economy. We use NBER recession dummy as an indicator of the health of the economy for this exercise. One might expect that default and exit options become more critical for equity valuation in recessions, when defaults are more likely. Third, we consider calendar patterns in our results by separately tabulating the results for the decades of 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.
Hedge portfolio value-weighted alphas are higher in non-January months (0.80%) than those in January (0.56%), where the latter is not statistically significant, likely due to small number of January observations. Our valuation model produces a hedge portfolio return of 1.61% in recessions and 0.89% in expansions, although only the latter is statistically significant. In unreported results, we find that the level of mispricing is a bit lower during the tech-boom of the 1990s, although it shows some spikes around the last three U.S. recessions.
Returns are also higher in the 1990s (1.00%) and this century (1.04%) than in the 1980s (0.69%). Patterns for equal-weighted alphas shown in the last column are different from those for value-weighted portfolios, yet the results remain significant for all sub-samples.
Equal-weighted portfolios have a high alpha of 3.60% in January that is due to the smallfirm January effect. There is not much difference between expansions and recessions and alphas are lower this century than those in the previous. Note that most overvalued stocks have particularly poor performance in recessions (4-factor alpha of −0.90%) , suggesting that recessions mitigate investors' appetite for such stocks and trigger correction. Most undervalued stocks, however, perform similarly well in both recessions and expansions. While the alphas of value-weighted portfolios are similar across the three decades, equally weighted alphas are lower in this century than in the previous, suggesting that the contribution of small stocks to mispricing has declined.
We look at the horizon effects in Panel B of Table 4 . Specifically, we consider holding periods of 3, 6, 12, and 18 months.
10 This implies that we have overlapping portfolios. We take equal-weighted average of these overlapping portfolios similar to the approach of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . The table shows that 10−1 returns are strong and statistically significant for horizons up to 18 months, although they decline as we increase the horizon.
In untabulated results, we look at month by month returns and find that most of the market value correction takes place in the first year after portfolio formation; there is almost no difference in returns between decile 1 and decile 10 in the 18th month after portfolio formation.
We conclude that our valuation model does well, in general, across various subsamples and over longer horizons.
It is also interesting to examine how the information gets into the price. In other words, if the misvalued stocks converge to their fundamental values in the future, does the market learn about actual defaults or cash flows? To answer these questions, we perform three additional tests. First, as noted earlier in the previous section, we find that both underand over-valued companies default more frequently than the rest of the stocks. Second, we calculate the option value as a fraction of total value at portfolio formation and one year after portfolio formation. We find that, for the extreme deciles one and ten, this fraction is 33% at portfolio formation but only 23% one year after. This suggests that the information about optionality is impounded in the price over the course of next year. Third, we follow the literature (eg. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) and Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) ) in examining what might be the triggers for this market learning. We replicate the results in Table 3 by partitioning the sample into firm-months with and without earnings announcements. The results show that with earnings announcement the model generates an alpha of 1.32% while the alpha is only 0.69% in months without earnings announcements; most of this difference arises from undervalued stocks. These tests show that the market learns slowly about both the actual defaults as well as cash flows of the misvalued firms.
has no material impact on our results. Note that our procedure implies that the proceeds from sales of delisted stocks are reinvested in each portfolio in proportion to the weights of the remaining stocks in the portfolio.
The importance of default option in model valuation
Our valuation model is inspired by the option-like characteristics of common stocks. We claim that the option value can be a significant fraction of the total value of equity for some categories of stocks. In this section we verify the importance of this default option in the ability of the model to value stocks and thereby predict returns amongst subgroups of stocks for which the option to default is likely to be more relevant. We focus on three firm characteristics for this exercise: financial distress, size, and volatility.
Perhaps, the most natural characteristic that one can associate with the relevance of the option to default is the extent of financial distress. In fact, the terms financial distress and high default risk are often used interchangeably: firms experiencing financial distress have more uncertainty about their ability to generate sufficient future cash flows, thus making the option to default particularly relevant for them. Put differently, for highly distressed firms the option to default is likely to be in-the-money, and thus captures significant fraction of the total equity value. We expect that our model's ability to detect misvaluation will be higher amongst financially distressed stocks. We employ the model of CHS (2008) to measure financial distress. 11 CHS use logit regressions to predict failure probabilities while incorporating a large set of accounting variables. Detailed description of the estimation procedure of this measure is provided in Appendix A.
The second characteristic that we consider is firm size. Since firm size is one input in the CHS distress measure, one can view firm size as a reduced-form proxy for the likelihood of default. Also, in general, young and small firms face more competitive challenges and higher capital constraints and are therefore more likely to default or abandon their business. We measure firm size by equity market value and expect that our model will perform better for small-cap stocks.
The third and last firm characteristic is stock return volatility. The high uncertainty about the future of firms facing the possibility of default is likely to be reflected in high stock return volatility. In particular, any news about future cash flows that affects the likelihood that the firm will default has a strong impact on the current price. In turn, as implied by option pricing theory, the value of option increases with the volatility of the underlying asset. We use idiosyncratic volatility as our main volatility measure. We obtain similar results by using total volatility instead. We follow Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) and calculate idiosyncratic volatility for each month by the standard deviation of the residuals of regression of daily stock returns on the daily Fama-French (1993) three factors augmented with the momentum factor. For each month, the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated during the previous month.
12 We expect better model performance for highly volatile stocks.
We proceed as follows to examine the effect of these characteristics on the returns to the relative valuation portfolios. Each month we first sort all stocks into five quintiles according to each characteristic, using current market data and quarterly accounting data of the previous quarter. We use equal-sized quintiles for distress and volatility and quintiles based on NYSE breakpoints for size. Then, within each characteristic quintile, we sort all stocks into five equal-sized portfolios according to the model value to market value. These second-sorted portfolios are labeled R1 (most overvalued) to R5 (most undervalued). Our double-sorted portfolios are well populated as the average number of stocks per portfolio is 123.
We report the mean fraction of default option value in the total equity value implied by our valuation model for value-weighted portfolios in the last column of each characteristic panel of Table 5 . To compute this fraction we run the model while shutting down the default option by disallowing default and exit and forcing equityholders to operate the firm indefinitely. The value of the option to default is then given by the difference in equity values with and without this option (see equation (4) 1.38% for the high-volatility stocks (for which default option is more valuable), whereas it is only 0.39% for the low-volatility stocks (where default option is less valuable).
Reflecting the better performance of the model for small stocks, equal-weighted hedge portfolio returns in Table 5 show stronger support for our conjecture. The equal-weighted portfolio return difference between stocks where default option is high and stocks where default option is low are higher than those for value-weighted portfolios. For instance, Panel B shows that 4-factor alpha of the equal-weighted hedge portfolio is 1.19% for the small size quintile and only 0.43% for the large stock quintile. The 4-factor alpha is 1.81% per month (t-statistic=6.12) for most distressed D5 stocks in Panel A and 1.82% (t-statistic=6.66) for most volatile IV5 stocks in Panel C, consistent with the highest fraction of default option amongst these categories of stocks.
The returns in Table 5 , thus, show that the strength of the model in valuing stocks is largely driven by the option to default. To provide a more direct test of the importance of default option in the total equity value, we recompute the returns to our double-sorted portfolios by shutting down the default option. Table 6 shows the 4-factor alphas to the longshort R5−R1 portfolios for each characteristic quintiles. The performance of the model in predicting returns deteriorates sharply without the option to default. For the top quintile of distressed stocks and idiosyncratic volatility stocks, the 4-factor alpha of the model without the default option is roughly a quarter of the magnitude of the alpha of the model with the default option. In particular, there is a reduction in 4-factor alpha from 1.19% to 0.28% for most distressed stocks, and from 1.38% to 0.33% for most volatile stocks. In contrast, reduction is alpha is relatively modest for small stocks. The deterioration in model performance is relatively more modest for equal-weighted portfolio returns in Panel B.
It is important to note a limitation of our results. While our valuation model performs best amongst the subset of securities with most valuable default options, the average returns across R1 to R5 quintiles among those stocks are often negative and also lower than the equivalent returns for the stocks with the least valuable default options. For example, the average 4-factor alpha across the R1 to R5 quintiles is −0.25% for the top distress D5 quintile and 0.19% for the bottom distress D1 quintile. These relatively low returns to distressed stocks are referred to as the distress puzzle in the literature (see, for example, CHS (2008)).
This fact implies that our valuation model still misses common factors relevant to stock values. We, therefore, urge caution in using our model as an absolute valuation model and prefer to use it as a means of relative valuation. We also reiterate that the power of our model is in the valuation of the option to default. For stocks far from the boundary of default, normal valuation techniques could still be adequate and not much may be gained by using our model for such stocks.
Fama-MacBeth regressions on relative model value
The portfolio sorts provide a simple view of the relation between returns and our variables of interest. Another approach commonly used in the literature is that of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. Beyond serving as an additional diagnostic check, these regressions offer the advantage that we can control for other well-known determinants of the cross-sectional patterns in returns and thus check for the marginal influence of relative model valuation on our results. Accordingly, we run these cross-sectional regressions and report the results in Table 7 . The dependent variable is the excess stock return while the independent variables are (log) market capitalization, (log) market-to-book, past six-month return, relative model value (log of the ratio of the equity value implied by our valuation model to the actual equity value;
higher numbers indicate undervaluation based on our model), CHS distress risk measure, volatility, and interaction terms between relative model value and the characteristics of interest. 13 We winsorize all independent variables at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the impact of outliers. All reported coefficients are multiplied by 100 and we report Newey-West (1987) corrected (with six lags) t-statistics in parentheses.
The first regression shows the usual patterns; returns are related to size, market-to-book, and past return. The second specification is the regression version of the univariate sorts in Table 3 showing that our valuation measure is able to predict returns. Regression (3) shows that distress and idiosyncratic volatility are negatively related to returns although the statistical significance of the volatility measure is not high for our sample period. Specifications (4) and (5) show that relative model value is positively associated with future returns 13 We do not control for some other additional characteristics such as asset growth (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) and equity issuance (Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) ). These characteristics are correlated with our relative valuation measures. For instance, as reported earlier, we view the fact that overvalued stocks issue more equity as a vindication of our model rather than treat equity issuance as competitor variable to relative model valuation in explaining future returns. even after inclusion of standard stock characteristics. These regressions, thus, provide robust multivariate evidence of the efficacy of our valuation measure that corroborates the portfolio-sort evidence.
Next, we interact our valuation measure with some characteristics to gauge whether our model works better for stocks with high value of default option. Specifications (6) through (9) are, thus, regression counterparts of Table 5 . Regressions (6)- (8) show that the interaction terms between relative model value and size, distress, and idiosyncratic volatility are statistically significant. This implies that our relative model value does particularly well for the subset of small stocks, distressed stocks, and more volatile stocks. It is important to note that the effect of the interaction term on size in specification (6) is highly statistically significant in contrast to the somewhat weaker results from portfolio sorts. Finally, including all variables and interaction terms in regression (9), we again find that the coefficients on relative model value and the interaction terms with size and distress are significant although the coefficient on the interaction term with idiosyncratic volatility loses its significance.
To summarize, the cross-sectional regressions of Table 7 coupled with the portfolio sort results provided in Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate the importance of the default option in the model valuation. Both portfolio sort results and regression based evidence suggest that the power of the model is stronger for stocks with higher values of default options and characteristics closely associated with financial distress and default.
International evidence
As an out-of-sample exercise, we check the efficacy of our model for a sample of nine developed markets, namely Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the U.K. We obtain stock returns and accounting data for international firms from Datastream and Worldscope. The availability of data varies across countries and is very scarce before early 1990s, so we start our sample in 1994. We follow standard filters in cleaning up the data (see, for example, İnce and Porter (2006) and Griffin, Kelly, and Nardari (2010) ). To ensure that we have a reasonable number of stocks for our tests, we also drop country-years with less than 100 firms with available data. As we use factor-model alphas in some of our tests, we build factors separately for each country following the approach of Fama and French (1993) .
For each country, we first perform valuation on the entire cross-section of stocks in the same way as detailed in Section 2. We make two adjustments to the procedure to account for data availability issues. First, we estimate the volatility of sales using annual data (based on past eight years) as quarterly accounting data is sparse for international firms. As for the U.S. sample, in cases where firm-specific volatility cannot be computed, we use the average annual volatility of sales of the firms in the same industry. For robustness we also report the results using quarterly sales, acknowledging that for a large proportion of the sample, the quarterly volatility of sales represents the industry average. Second, we use distanceto-default from Merton's (1974) model instead of CHS (2008) to construct industry-distress peer groups and cost of debt. This is because Merton model uses only equity value, equity volatility, and the face value of debt, as opposed to CHS and other models that rely on a large set of accounting variables. Table 8 shows country-specific descriptive statistics. Our summary statistics are in general consistent with other international studies, despite some differences in the sample periods. See, for example, Fama and French (1998) and Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) . There is a substantial variation in the number of firms with available data across countries, from only 175 firms (12,701 firm-months) in Switzerland to 4,305 (551,830 firm-months) in Japan.
Market-to-book ratio exhibits two regimes; Hong Kong, Italy, and Japan have fairly low ratios (means of 1.19 to 1.67), where the other seven countries show higher ratios (2.14 to 2.80). Italy and Japan also show relatively high levels of market leverage (mean ratios of 0.40 and 0.36), which is consistent with the low market-to-book ratios in these countries.
In the rest of the countries the mean market leverage ranges between 0.21 and 0.30, which is more comparable to the level of U.S. firms. Finally, monthly stock returns also vary significantly across countries, from an average of 0.12% in Italy to 1.37% in Australia. This suggests that our exercise captures different states of the economy across countries. We view all these differences in firm characteristics as an advantage because they allow us to examine whether our model can be successful in predicting returns for different types of samples and conditions.
Using the model valuation, we sort stocks into deciles and calculate value-and equalweighted returns. The returns and alphas of the hedge portfolio that is long in undervalued stocks and short in overvalued stocks are reported in Panel A of Table 9 . For value-weighted portfolios, the excess returns range from 0.07% for Italy to 1.51% for Hong Kong. For the most part, alphas are similar to excess returns. Focusing on 4-factor alphas, we find positive alphas in eight countries with Italy being an exception; four of these alphas are statistically significant (two more are significant at 10% significance level). As was the case for the U.S., equal-weighted portfolios generate a bigger spread in returns. This suggests that small stocks are typically more mispriced than large stocks in other developed markets as well. With the exception of Italy again, 4-factor alphas are positive and statistically significant for all other eight countries; the 4-factor alpha is highest at 1.99% for Australia and lowest at 0.82% for Germany, with t-statistics of 2.48 to 4.62. Panel B shows fairly similar results when using quarterly data in calculating volatility of sales; the means of the 4-factor alphas on the valueand equal-weighted hedge portfolios are 0.95% and 1.00% per months, compared to 0.79% and 1.19% using annual data.
We show the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions in Table 10 . We run regressions separately for each country. The dependent variable is the relative model value defined as the log of the ratio of the equity value implied by our valuation model to the actual equity value. The independent variables are (log) market capitalization, (log) market-to-book, past six-month return, and relative model value. The coefficients on size, market-to-book, and past returns are, for the most part, consistent with the extant evidence. The coefficient of interest to us is the one on relative model value. Since the magnitudes of the coefficients are difficult to compare across countries, we focus on the statistical significance. The coefficient is positive for all nine countries we analyze and significant for six of these countries (tstatistics from 2.32 to 3.18). The coefficient is also significant at a 10% level for Switzerland (t-statistic of 1.82).
To conclude, the evidence from the sample of developed countries is consistent with that for the U.S., providing further evidence that our model is able to identify stocks that are mispriced.
Conclusion
Equities are embedded with an option to default. We believe that a meaningful equity valuation model should take this optionality into account. An important question is whether investors recognize this insight and account for default option when valuing equity. To address this question we build such a model by accounting for the value of the option to default or abandon the firm. Our model does a good job in separating over-and undervalued stocks. The long-short strategy that buys stocks that are classified as undervalued by our model and shorts overvalued stocks generates an annualized 4-factor alpha of about 11%.
This performance is robust to various sample splits and holding periods. Furthermore, a similar investment strategy produces significantly higher returns for stocks with relatively high value of default option, namely distressed, highly volatile, and small stocks, articulating the importance of the option to default as the key ingredient of our model. International evidence from nine largest developed markets reinforces our U.S.-based results. This suggests that default options are mispriced by the market and, in general, investors do not fully recognize the option-like nature of equities and do not value them accordingly.
Appendix A: Distress Measure
Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) use logit regressions to predict failure probabilities. We use their model for predicting bankruptcy over the next year (model with lag 12 in their Table IV ) as our baseline model. This model, which is repeated below, gives the probability of bankruptcy/failure from a logit model as:
CHS t = −9.16 − 20.26 NIMT AAV G t + 1.42 T LMT A t − 7.13 EXRET AV G t +1.41 SIGMA t − 0.045 RSIZE t − 2.13 CASHMT A t + 0.075
where NIMT A is the net income divided by the market value of total assets (the sum of market value of equity and book value of total liabilities), T LMT A is the book value of total liabilities divided by market value of total assets, EXRET is the log of the ratio of the gross returns on the firm's stock and on the S&P500 index, SIGMA is the standard deviation of the firm's daily stock return over the past three months, RSIZE is ratio of the log of firm's equity market capitalization to that of the S&P500 index, CASHMT A is the ratio of the firm's cash and short-term investments to the market value of total assets, MB is the marketto-book ratio of the firm's equity, and P RICE is the log price per share. NIMT AAV G and EXRET AV G are moving averages of NIMT A and EXRET , respectively, constructed as (with φ = 2
NIMT AAV G t−1,t−12 = 1 − φ 3 1 − φ 12 NIMT A t−1,t−3 + . . . + φ 9 NIMT A t−10,t−12 ,
The source of accounting data is COMPUSTAT while all market level data are from CRSP. All accounting data are taken with a lag of three months for quarterly data and a lag of six months for annual data. All market data used in calculating the distress measure of equation (A1) are the most current data. We winsorize all inputs at the 5th and 95th percentiles of their pooled distributions across all firm-months (winsorizing at the 2nd and 98th percentiles has no material impact on our results), and P RICE is truncated above at $15. Further details on the data construction are provided by CHS (2008) and we refer the interested reader to their paper.
14 We include all common stocks, although our results are robust to the exclusion of financial stocks. The sample period for our study is 1983 to 2012 as the coverage of quarterly COMPUSTAT data is sparse before this date.
Appendix B: Numerical Details on the Valuation Model
The first step is to find a value of the firm that survives until year five and pays off its longterm debt. We assume that at the end of year five, the firm refinances by issuing perpetual coupon debt in an amount to match the average 2-digit SIC market leverage ratio. We assume refinancing to average industry leverage, as opposed to inferring the optimal leverage from the model due to the known tendency of structural contingent claim models to predict optimal leverage ratios that appear too high compared with their empirical counterparts.
The net instantaneous post-refinancing cash flow to equityholders is:
where the coupon amount is c i . The cash flow to bondholders is c i dt. Note that the additional cost of financial distress η is incurred if x it < x * , where:
Because we assume that the gross margin ratio, GM it , as well as the depreciation-to-sales and capex-to-sales ratios stay constant over time, x * is given by:
The cash flows to equityholders and, therefore, the value of equity depend on whether the current value of x it is above or below the threshold x * . The cash flows in equation (B1) above can be rewritten as:
Then standard arguments show that the value of equity is given by:
where β 1 and β 2 are the positive and the negative root of the quadratic equation 1 2 σ 2 β(β − 1) + µ Q β − r = 0, and A, B, C, and D are constants. Equation (B4) must be solved subject to the following boundary conditions:
The first boundary condition precludes bubbles as x increases, the second and third conditions ensure that the value functions and their first derivatives match at x * , and the fourth and fifth conditions are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions that ensure optimality of the default threshold x d . Together, these conditions comprise a system of four non-linear equations with four unknowns (B, C, D, and x d ) that must be solved numerically. By solving this system we find the post-refinancing value of equity in year five, E(x i5 ).
The value of debt is given by:
where V U (x d ) is the value of the unlevered firm and α is the bankruptcy costs (upon default debtholders get this unlevered value, net of bankruptcy costs). Note that V U (x d ) is always positive because the value of equity is decreasing in the total fixed cash outflow c i + F i , and so is the optimal default/ exit boundary. This implies that for c i > 0 the optimal default threshold x d is greater than the optimal exit threshold of the same firm with no debt and hence the value of that firm at x d is positive. When implementing this procedure, we set α = η = 15%. For a given x i5 (we assume that the long-term debt is repaid in five years) we find the value of c i such that
is equal to the average 2-digit SIC leverage ratio in the last three years. If we are unable to find this solution (e.g. for high enough values of fixed costs), we assume that the firm remains unlevered throughout the rest of its life. The prerefinancing equity value equals the sum of the post-refinancing value and the proceeds from issuing debt:
Once we find the terminal value of equity in year five, E (x i5 ), we solve the model numerically and compute the optimal default boundary and equity values for all t ≤ T = 5. For that purpose, we introduce a new variable y t = log(x t ), that follows an arithmetic Brownian motion under the risk-neutral measure:
We then discretize the problem by using a two-dimensional grid N y ×N t with the corresponding increments of y and t given by dy and dt, where dy = (y max − y min )/N y and dt = T /N t , where T = 5. To get a reasonable balance between execution speed and accuracy we set dt = 0.1, y min = −5, and y max = 10 when implementing this algorithm. We iterate valuations backwards using a binomial approximation of the Brownian motion (see, for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) ). At each node the equityholders have an option to default. They will default if the present value (under Q) of running the firm for one more period is negative:
where
Equation (B9) shows that at each node the value of equity is given by the discounted present value of equity the next time period plus the cash flows that equityholders receive over the time period dt. If this value is negative, then the firm is below the optimal default boundary so it is optimal for equityholders to default, in which case the value of equity is zero. (We assume that the absolute priority rule is enforced if bankruptcy occurs and the residual payout to equityholders is zero.) Each month, we sort all stocks into deciles according to the ratio of the equity value implied by our valuation model to the actual equity value (Decile 1=most overvalued, Decile 10=most undervalued). The portfolios are value-weighted and held for one subsequent month. The table shows the portfolios' mean excess monthly returns (in excess of the risk-free rate) and alphas from factor models. The CAPM one-factor model uses the market factor. The three factors in the three-factor model are the Fama and French (1993) factors. The four factors in the four-factor model are the Fama-French factors augmented with a momentum factor. We also show the equal-weighted (ew) returns/alphas on the long-short 10−1 portfolio in the last column. All returns and alphas are in percent per month and the corresponding t-statistics are in parentheses. Each month, we sort all stocks into deciles according to the ratio of the equity value implied by our valuation model to the actual equity value (Decile 1=most overvalued, Decile 10=most undervalued). The portfolios are value-weighted and held for one subsequent month. The table reports 4-factor alphas where the factors are market, size, book-to-market, and momentum. We also show the alpha on the equal-weighted (ew) long-short 10−1 portfolio in the last column. All alphas are in percent per month and the corresponding t-statistics are in parentheses. The full sample period is 1983 to 2012. The full sample period is broken up three different ways into subsamples in Panel A. Recession and expansion periods are based on NBER recession dummy. The holding period is increased to 3, 6, 12, and 18 We run cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions each month of excess stock returns. The independent variables are (log) market capitalization, (log) market-to-book, past six-month return, distress-risk measure, idiosyncratic volatility, and relative model value (RelModVal). Market-to-book ratio is calculated as the ratio of current market value divided by book value of the previous quarter. We skip one month in calculating the six-month returns. Distress is calculated based on CHS (2008) using current market data and quarterly accounting data of the previous quarter. Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals of regression of daily stock returns on the daily four factors over the last month. Relative model value is the log of the ratio of the equity value implied by our valuation model to the actual equity value. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 and Newey-West corrected t-statistics (with six lags) are in parentheses. The sample period is 1983 to 2012.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) For each country listed below, each month, we sort all stocks into deciles according to the ratio of the equity value implied by our valuation model to the actual equity value (Decile 1=most overvalued, Decile 10=most undervalued). The portfolios are value-weighted and held for one subsequent month. The table shows the portfolios' mean excess monthly returns (in excess of the risk-free rate) and alphas from factor models. The CAPM one-factor model uses the market factor. The three factors in the three-factor model are the Fama and French (1993) factors. The four factors in the four-factor model are the Fama-French factors augmented with a momentum factor. All factors are calculated separately for each country. We also show the equal-weighted (ew) alpha of the long short 10−1 portfolio in the last column. All returns and alphas are in percent per month and the corresponding t-statistics are in parentheses. We run cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions each month of excess stock returns separately for each country listed below. The independent variables are (log) market capitalization, (log) market-to-book, past six-month return, and relative model value. Market-to-book ratio is calculated as the ratio of current market value divided by book value of the previous quarter. We skip one month in calculating the six-month returns. Relative model value is the log of the ratio of the equity value implied by our valuation model to the actual equity value. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 and Newey-West corrected t-statistics (with six lags) are in parentheses. The sample period is 1994 to 2012. 
